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I. INTRODUCTION
It’s hardly newsdomestic violence1 is universally condemned.
Society is no longer actively colluding with batterers. As one family
court judge put it: society has withdrawn its consent to domestic
violence.2 Further, efforts to combat intimate terrorism and its ill
effects can be seen everywhere. And these efforts have yielded results,
as evidenced by some estimating domestic violence to be down by sixtyfour percent.3
The progress towards stemming domestic terrorism includes
increased services, new and expanded legislation, domestic violence
specialists in law enforcement and child abuse agencies, increased
funding, and societal opprobrium. There is a Domestic Violence
Awareness Month and a Teen Dating Violence Awareness Month;4
buses and billboards exhort men to help stop the violence; and the
National Football League created a domestic violence commission to
deal with its internal and public mishandling of NFL players’ violence
towards their intimate partners.5 In addition, the New York Times
features botched domestic violence investigations above the fold on its
front page,6 and a presidential proclamation recognizes the right to be
1

Domestic violence is perhaps the most common term presently used for this
phenomenon. Other phrases include intimate partner violence and intimate
terrorism. The various terms will be used interchangeably throughout.
2
Judge Michael J. Voris, The Domestic Violence Civil Protection Order and the Role of
the Court, 24 AKRON L. REV. 423, 425 (1990) (“It has only been a relatively short time
since society has withdrawn its consent to domestic violence.”).
3
Shannan Catalano, Intimate Partner Violence, 19932010, U.S. DEP’T JUST. 1
(2012), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ipv9310.pdf (“From 1994 to 2010, the
overall rate of intimate partner violence in the United States declined by 64%, from
9.8 victimizations per 1,000 persons age 12 or older to 3.6 per 1,000.”). What one
counts as intimate partner violence affects the statistics; some would suggest that this
sixty-four percent statistic is wildly optimistic. But, in a quote that has been attributed
to Mark Twain, Benjamin Disraeli and others, “[t]here are . . . lies, damned lies, and
statistics.” See RESPECTFULLY QUOTED: A DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS REQUESTED FROM
THE CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE 333 (Suzy Platt ed., 1989).
4
See “CDC Features,” CDC, (last updated Feb. 3, 2016); “Domestic Violence
Awareness Month,” NNEDV, http://nnedv.org/getinvolved/dvam.html (last visited
Feb. 29, 2016) (noting this information under the “Get Involved” tab).
5
See Sam Farmer & Nathan Fenno, Roger Goodell Names Four Women to Guide NFL
15,
2014,
9:05
PM),
Domestic
Violence
Policy,
L.A. TIMES (Sept.
http://www.latimes.com/sports/nfl/la-sp-nfl-violence-goodell-20140916-story.html.
Further, NFL Commissioner Roger Goodell was subject to an investigation of his amply
criticized investigation and punishment of former player Ray Rice’s acts of domestic
violence. This latter investigation was itself a high profile and publicized investigation
conducted by former Federal Bureau of Investigation director Robert Mueller. See id.
6
See Walt Bogdanich & Glenn Silber, Two Gunshots on a Summer Night, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 24, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/projects/2013/two-gunshots/. This was
also made into a documentary: “A Death in St. Augustine.” See id.
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free from intimate partner abuse as a human right.7
In addition to news features and public service campaigns, the
acknowledged scourge of intimate terrorism is displayed in popular
culture through social media, books, movies, and television.8
Thankfully, some evidence of shifting attitudes is visible. Although it
still may be acceptable to use the term “wife beater” for those sleeveless
T-shirts,9 asking “Have you stopped beating your wife yet?” as the classic
unfair question has more or less fallen into disuse.10
All of this is indeed an improvement from the time when domestic
violence was mandated or at the very least condoned by the law11 and
held permissible by religious teachings12a time, in short, when
societal consent was full-throated. The widespread efforts to declare
domestic violence unacceptable, and to provide remedies and services
to combat it, are clear signs of progress. Although this progress is good
to appreciate, roughly forty years into the work,13 it is too soon to sit
back and bellow “Mission Accomplished!” Work remains to be done.
One aid in figuring out what needs to be done is to reflect on what has

7

Proclamation No. 9337, 80 Fed. Reg. 60,263 (Sept. 30, 2015),
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2015-10-05/pdf/FR-2015-10-05.pdf.
8
See, e.g., ANNA QUINDLEN, BLACK AND BLUE: A NOVEL (1998); @Whyileft,
TWITTER, https://twitter.com/whyileft (last visited Feb. 24, 2016); see also PAULA SHARP,
CROWS OVER A WHEATFIELD (1996); SLEEPING WITH THE ENEMY (20th Century Fox 1991).
9
See Elizabeth Hayt, Noticed; An Undershirt Named . . . What?, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 22,
2001),
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/04/22/style/noticed-an-undershirt-namedwhat.html. Of course, the term’s use has been challenged. See Janet Kornblum,
Feminists Decry Online Sale of ‘Wife Beater’ T-Shirts, USA TODAY (Feb. 8, 2002, 11:42 AM),
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/tech/news/2001-04-25-ebrief.htm (“Calling a white
ribbed sleeveless undershirt a ‘wife beater’ appears to have come from the TV show
Cops, where a surprising number of men are arrested wearing them.”).
10
Former NBA Commissioner David Stern used it to call out what he believed to
be an unfair question. NBA’s Finest Vids, David Stern Jim Rome Radio Argument Have
(June
13,
2012),
You
Stopped
Beating
Your
Wife
Yet?,
YOUTUBE
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=73vGdCaC048; see also Transcript of McCain
Interview, LAS VEGAS SUN (June 26, 2008, 8:10 AM), http://lasvegassun.com/blogs/
ralstons-flash/2008/jun/26/transcript-mccain-interview.
11
See Beirne Stedman, Right of Husband to Chastise Wife, 3 VA. L. REG. 241, 241–48
(1917); see also id. at 241 (“Under the early Roman law the marital power of the
husband was absolute, and he could chastise his wife even to the point of killing her.”)
(footnote omitted).
12
See generally Rev. Dr. Marie Fortune & Rabbi Cindy Enger, Violence Against Women
and the Role of Religion, NAT’L RESOURCE CTR. ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE,
http://www.vawnet.org/applied-research-papers/print-document.php?doc_id=411
(last visited Feb. 24, 2016).
13
See generally PENNSYLVANIA COALITION AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE,
http://pcadv.org (last visited Feb. 29, 2016) [hereinafter Pennsylvania Coalition]. It
is generally accepted that the first state statute authorizing protective order relief
against domestic violence was passed in Pennsylvania in 1976.
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already been done and how effective those efforts have been.
This Article will take a critical look at past “reforms” and their
results. To that end, Part II will summarize some key areas where
efforts at reform have yielded perverse results. Part III will examine
the unanticipated consequences of these reforms in more detail. The
Article will conclude with Part IV’s effort to understand the reasons for
the perverse results: why the ideas, laws, and policies that are intended
to assist victim-survivors have at times become tools to further harm
them.
This examination will take into account that unanticipated
consequences in domestic violence reform can be caused by various
factors, some of which are benign.14 It will also explore the possibility
that the repeated occurrence of these consequences are the result of
“soft misogyny,” a term used here to mean the bias, often implicit, that
operates in people who are not, at core, misogynists but who
nonetheless attribute substantial culpability to the domestic violence
victim.15 In addition, soft misogynists use, often unawares, subtle ways
to punish that perceived culpability.16
This soft misogyny is reflected in the phrase offered up by New
York Times columnist Nicholas Kristof: “misogyny without
misogynists.”17 Akin to sociologist Eduardo Bonilla-Silva’s phrase
“racism without racists,”18 soft misogyny is behaviors and beliefs
dismissive of and harmful to women that occur without the conscious
knowledge of the belief-holder. As Kristof asserts, “there are diehard . . . misogynists out there, but the bigger problem seems to be
well-meaning people who believe in equal rights yet make decisions
that inadvertently transmit . . . sexism.”19

14

See Robert K. Merton, The Unanticipated Consequences of Purposive Social Action, 1
AM. SOC. REV. 894, 895 (1936) (“Furthermore, unforeseen consequences should not be
identified with consequences that are necessarily undesirable (from the standpoint of
the actor). For though these results are unintended, they are not upon their
occurrence always deemed axiologically negative.”).
15
“Victim” is often and appropriately perceived as a pejorative term with the word
“survivor” sometimes used instead. Author uses either of the two terms or a combined
phrase interchangeably throughout the Article.
16
Implicit bias is well-documented. See Project Implicit Publications, PROJECT
IMPLICIT, https://www.projectimplicit.net/papers.html (last visited Feb. 29, 2016).
17
Nicholas Kristof, Straight Talk for White Men, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 21, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/22/opinion/sunday/nicholas-kristof-straighttalk-for-white-men.html?_r=0.
18
See generally EDUARDO BONILLA-SILVA, RACISM WITHOUT RACISTS: COLOR-BLIND
RACISM AND THE PERSISTENCE OF RACIAL INEQUALITY IN AMERICA (2009).
19
See Kristof, supra, note 17.
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II. OVERVIEW OF UNANTICIPATED CONSEQUENCES
Unanticipated consequences are consequences that are set in
motion by an action that is intended to yield a particular result.20 The
intended result may occur but so too flow unexpected and often
undesired results.21 In other words, these consequences result from a
good idea that has, in some way, gone bad.
Efforts to combat intimate terrorism have led to many
unanticipated consequences. Too often, an idea or legal reform
offered with the best motive of assisting victims-survivors has ended up
harming them.22 Scholars and activists now decry the unfortunate
consequences that battered women may face as a result of mandatory
arrest and no-drop prosecution policies.23 Similarly, scholars lament
the over-criminalization of domestic violence, and both the inaccuracy
and lack of success of the battered woman’s syndrome.24 Others
critique specialized domestic violence courts, which were once
heralded as a panacea.25
The author of this Article has earlier explored the harms that
result from the misapplication of child abuse laws and practices.
Initially, those laws and practices ignored instances of intimate partner
violence. The laws and practices then shifted to removing children
20

See Merton, supra note 14. Merton writes:
Furthermore, unforeseen consequences should not be identified
with consequences which are necessarily undesirable (from the
standpoint of the actor).
For though these results are
unintended, they are not upon their occurrence always deemed
axiologically negative . . . . The intended and anticipated
outcomes of purposive action, however, are always, in the very
nature of the case, relatively desirable to the actor, though they
may seem axiologically negative to an outside observer.
21
Often, unanticipated consequences may be used in common parlance to refer
especially to those consequences that are negative—perverse, even. Merton cautions,
however, that “[u]nforeseen consequences should not be identified with
consequences which are necessarily undesirable (from the standpoint of the actor).
For though these results are unintended, they are not upon their occurrence always
deemed axiologically negative.” Id. (emphasis removed).
22
See generally Justine A. Dunlap, Intimate Terrorism and Technology: There’s an App
for That, 7 U. MASS. L. REV. 10 (2012); see also Lisa Bolotin, When Parents Fight: Alaska’s
Presumption against Awarding Custody to Perpetrators of Domestic Violence, 25 ALASKA L. REV.
264 (2008); Cheryl Hanna, No Right to Choose: Mandated Victim Participation in Domestic
Violence Prosecutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1849 (1996); Donna M. Welch, Mandatory Arrest
of Domestic Abusers: Panacea or Perpetuation of the Problem of Abuse?, 43 DEPAUL L. REV.
1133 (1993).
23
See discussion infra Parts III.B.2 & 3.
24
See discussion infra Parts III.B.1 & 4.
25
See generally Kathryn Gillespie Wellman, Taking the Next Step in the Legal Response
to Domestic Violence: The Need to Reexamine Specialized Domestic Violence Courts from a Victim
Perspective, 24 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 444 (2013).
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from the survivors of abuse because of the alleged harm caused by
exposure to intimate terrorism.26 Other critics have catalogued
problems in the child custody system, which likewise ignored the
occurrence of domestic violence for years before beginning to
consider it, oft times in ways harmful to women.27
Finally, protection order statutes were long considered to be
needlessly restrictive in limiting the population entitled to relief.28 For
instance, early protection order statutes often required a victim to be
married to her abuser in order to obtain legal relief. This narrow
coverage excluded many who needed protection from intimate
partner violence. The limitations were glaring: couples living together,
those with a child in common, ex-spouses, and same sex couples were
all excluded.
Accordingly, expanding the relationships covered in protection
order statutes has been a desired good. Over time, states changed their
statutes to encompass unmarried couples living together and, in some
states, those in a dating or intimate relationship.29 Many of the
expansions have been a welcome addition and appropriately grant
protection to those terrorized by their intimate partners.
Unfortunately, problems occur when this expanded coverage fits
within its large tent non-intimate relationships.30 This was the case
when, in 2014, news headlines proclaimed: “Soccer Star Hope Solo
Arrested on Domestic Violence Charges.”31 The victims were Solo’s
sister and Solo’s seventeen-year-old nephew. Should this assault have
happened? Of course not. Is it helpful to lump star athletes Hope Solo
and Ray Rice together as domestic violence perpetrators?32 Again, of
26

See, e.g., Justine A. Dunlap, The Pitiless Double Abuse of Battered Mothers, 11 AM. U.
J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 523, 525 (2003); see generally Justine A. Dunlap, Sometimes I
Feel Like a Motherless Child: The Error of Pursuing Battered Mothers for Failure to Protect, 50
LOY. L. REV. 565 (2004) [hereinafter Dunlap, Motherless Child].
27
See discussion infra Part III.C.3.
28
See discussion infra Part III.A.
29
Both legislatures and courts applying statutes have toiled over definitions of
both “dating” and “intimate.” See discussion infra Part III.A.2.
30
See, e.g., Bonbrake v. Lee, No.43989–1–II, 2014 WL 465642 (Wash. Ct. App. Feb.
4, 2014) (affirming grant of domestic violence protection order to roommates); Everitt
v. Everitt, No. 24860, 2010 WL 816615 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 10, 2010) (affirming grant
of domestic violence civil protection order against father protecting son); Reynolds v.
White, No. 43989–1–II, 1999 WL 754496 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 23, 1999) (affirming
grant of domestic violence civil protection order for daughter against father).
31
Sam Frizzell, Soccer Star Hope Solo Arrested on Domestic Violence Charges, TIME (June
21, 2014), http://time.com/2908322/hope-solo-arrested/.
32
NFL player Ray Rice was suspended when videos of him punching his fiancé in
an elevator were made public. Ken Belson, A Punch Is Seen, and a Player Is Out, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 8, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/09/sports/football/ray-
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course not. In short, expanding relationships that are covered by
protection order statutes is a good thing—until it gets taken to an
illogical conclusion, at which point it operates to diminish intimate
partner violence.
Progress does not occur in an unbroken plane. Changes and
reforms inevitably have effects not expected or unintentionally
minimized. Nor could it be otherwise. The perfect is indeed the
enemy of the good; if a perfect solution is the goal, no good solution
will ever be advanced. This truth notwithstanding, it remains fruitful
to take a hard look at the unanticipated consequences that harm
survivors of intimate partner violence. If an understanding can be
gained of some of the reasons that reforms intended to benefit
survivors of intimate terrorism are transformed into tools that further
harm them,33 then progress with fewer perverse consequences might
be the result.
III. COMMON UNANTICIPATED CONSEQUENCES IN DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
REFORM
A. Expanded Protection Order Coverage
1. Introduction
Civil protection orders are a mainstay for domestic violence
survivors, with every state having statutory authority for them.34 Many
advocates against domestic violence believe that civil protection orders
have numerous advantages over criminal remedies, for the reasons
enumerated below.35
First, the civil protection order process is instituted and
controlled by the survivor.36 Second, civil orders can outlast the
criminal process and offer greater protection to a survivor, not the least
rice-video-shows-punch-and-raises-new-questions-for-nfl.html?emc=eta1.
33
Often their children are also harmed. See Dunlap, Motherless Child, supra note
26, at 58586.
34
Indeed, these orders are often viewed as the single best choice for survivors.
35
See Sally Goldfarb, Reconceiving Civil Protection Orders, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1487,
1508 (2008).
36
Even though the survivor institutes the process, there may be pressure on the
survivor to do so. Some service providers, including shelters, may require that a
domestic violence survivor, in order to be eligible for services, pursue a civil protection
order. Similarly, child protection workers may threaten to remove the survivor’s
children from the home unless the survivor pursues a protection order. These
policies, whatever the arguments in their favor, force the survivor’s hand, thus
undercutting her autonomy. See Nina W. Tarr, Civil Orders for Protection: Freedom or
Entrapment, 11 WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y 157, 15859 (2003).

DUNLAP (DO NOT DELETE)

782

3/21/2016 12:47 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:775

of which in circumstances where the criminal charges are dismissed.
Third, civil protection order remedies are, generally, broad. This
wider array of remedies, which include child custody and financial
support, may help provide the necessary support to allow the survivor
to escape the coercive control of the intimate terrorist.37
An extant civil protection order can also be beneficial to the
criminal side of the process. Increased police attention and power
often accompany a violation of a protection order. For instance, some
mandatory arrest statutes are triggered only when there has been a
violation of a protection order.38 Mandatory arrest at this later stage
avoids many of the pitfalls of mandatory arrest earlier in the process,
including, one hopes, less of a likelihood of dual arrest.39
In sum, there are multiple benefits to civil protection orders.
Because this remedy is available in every state and has many
advantages, it is important that it be as effective as possible. Moreover,
it should be used to address the problem for which it was conceived:
intimate partner abuse.
2. Evolution of Coverage under Protection Order Statutes
The first wave of protection order statutes often excluded groups
of people in need of protection. For instance, some statutes literally
limited relief to spouses; others that appeared at first blush to apply
more broadly turned out to be equally as narrow.40 The 1979
Washington Revised Code, for instance, granted the right to relief to
cohabitants.41 But, it then unusually cabined the definition of
cohabitant to a spouse or persons living together as husband and
wife—either in the past or present. The statute also included within
its ambit persons having a child in common whether or not they were
37

See MICHAEL P. JOHNSON, A TYPOLOGY OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: INTIMATE
TERRORISM, VIOLENT RESISTANCE, AND SITUATIONAL COUPLE VIOLENCE 16, 53–54, 75, 82
(2008); see generally Evan Stark, Re-presenting Woman Battering: From Battered Woman
Syndrome to Coercive Control, 58 ALB. L. REV. 973 (1995); Jane K. Stoever, Freedom from
Violence: Using the Stages of Change Model to Realize the Promise of Civil Protection Orders, 72
OHIO ST. L.J. 303 (2011). Professor Jane Stoever has proposed using a “stages of
change” model to help understand why survivors do not “just leave” at the first hint of
intimate coercive control and terrorism. See generally Stoever, supra. Further, her
application of this psychological counseling theory to domestic violence settings can
assist both the survivor and her advocates to set in place the supports necessary to
enable successful disentanglement from an intimate terrorist.
38
See, e.g., MASS. GEN LAWS ANN. ch. 209A, § 6(7) (West 2016).
39
See infra Part III.B.2 for a discussion regarding the problems associated with
dual arrests.
40
The frequently used term of the day—wife abuse—was in vogue for good
reason.
41
Wash. Rev. Code § 10.99.020(2) (1979).
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ever married or resided together.42
Pennsylvania, often cited as the first state to legislate protection
orders,43 threw in an additional element. It provided protection for
family or household members who “reside together.”44 It then defined
family or household members as: “spouses, persons living as spouses,
parents and children, or other persons related by consanguinity or
affinity.”45 Thus, Pennsylvania added non-romantic relationships into
the pool of those entitled to relief. Early versions of the Massachusetts
statute also defined the statutorily protected “[f]amily or household
member” as: “household member, a spouse, former spouse or their
minor children or blood relative.”46
Today, many protection order statutes have a larger class of
protected persons as, over time, state legislatures realized that many of
the limitations excluded those who needed protection from intimate
partner violence. Common expansions include gay and lesbian
couples, those who have a child in common, or persons in a dating
relationship.47
Enacting these changes has not been easy; nor has judicial
application of the law been entirely smooth as courts struggle to
discern legislative intent.48 The imprecision of the term “dating
relationship” is a good example. To provide guidance in this area,
some statutes, for instance, specify that dating relationships exclude
casual relationships or “ordinary fraternization.”49
Some states have been slow to change; this is true even in states
that might be considered progressive.50 For instance, it was not until
2008 that New York broadened its statute to include dating
relationships, same-sex or otherwise.51 Although advocates had sought
for years to expand the coverage, the change had been long met with
42

§ 10.99.020(1).
See generally Pennsylvania Coalition, supra note 13.
44
S. 1243, Gen. Assemb. 1976 Sess. (Pa. 1976).
45
Id.
46
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 209A, § 1 (1978).
47
Most states enacted laws covering married couples; some extended their laws to
include opposite-sex couples living together or in a marriage-like relationship.
48
For a discussion on defining intimacy, see Sarah Lawson, Note, Expanding the
Scope of Who May Petition for Domestic Violence Protective Orders in Kentucky, 102 KY. L.J. 527,
534–35 (2013–2014).
49
See, e.g., TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 71.0021(c) (West 2015).
50
See, e.g., Judith A. Smith, Battered Non-wives and Unequal Protection-order Coverage:
A Call for Reform, 23 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 93, 93 (2005).
51
See Jennifer Cranstoun et al., What’s an Intimate Relationship, Anyway? Expanding
Access to the New York State Family Courts for Civil Orders of Protection, 29 PACE L. REV. 455,
455 (2009).
43
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resistance that prevented its passage. One unspoken objection
appeared to be a concern that allowing protection against same-sex
intimate partner violence would serve to advance the argument for gay
marriage.52 Another concern raised by those opposing expansion was
the burden that would be placed on the family court system.53
a. Intimate Partner Abuse vs. Family Violence
Expanding protection to include all survivors of intimate
terrorism has long been called for and is warranted.54 A survivor should
not be excluded from receiving a civil protection order because she is
neither married to nor a de facto spouse of her abuser.
Even some of the older statutory relationship definitions included
non-intimate partners, such as: roommates; household members; or
those related by consanguinity or affinity. These broader terms may
have found their way into statutes based upon the way in which the
federal government focused on these issues in the 1980s. At that time,
there was increased concern for child abuse as well as intimate partner
violence; often times, the two were joined under the label of family
violence.55
The first federal law to address domestic violence was the Family
Violence Prevention and Service Act (FVSPA). Predating the Violence
Against Women Act by a decade, the FVSPA focuses on “family
violence,” which includes “many types of family relationships.”56 It
specifically separates domestic violence as a sub-type of family violence
that involves intimate partners.57 The Act also deals separately with
dating violence, which it defines as violence committed by one who is
or was “in a social relationship of a romantic or intimate nature with
the victim.”58 It gives guidance on how to assess that relationship by
considering “the length of the relationship, the type of relationship,
and the frequency of interaction between” those involved in the
relationship.59

52

See id. at 456–57.
Id. at 456.
54
See, e.g., Smith, supra note 50.
55
See Adrienne L. Fernandes-Alcantara, Family Violence Prevention and Services Act
(FVPSA): Background and Funding, CONG. RES. SERV. (Oct. 14, 2015),
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42838.pdf for a comprehensive review of these
aspects of the FVSPA.
56
Id. at 2.
57
Id.
58
Id.
59
Id.
53

DUNLAP (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

3/21/2016 12:47 PM

SOFT MISOGYNY

785

The FVSPA appropriately distinguishes between intimate partner
abuse and broader family violence. Domestic violence statutes should
be especially targeted for a rather particular purpose—to protect
current and former intimate partners from coercive control, and
physical and emotional battery and abuse. Persons who are not
intimate partners should not be included in domestic violence
protection order laws designed to protect those in intimate partner
relationships.60
There are several reasons why expanded coverage to nonintimates is not appropriate. First, it is unnecessary, as other legal
protections are available—often in addition to standard criminal
proceedings.61 Therefore, persons will still have legal recourse even if
they do not fall within the purview of a protection order statute.62
Second, affording relief to non-intimate partners under domestic
violence protection order statutes creates an issue of “fit”: protection
order remedies typically have been designed—or at least ought to have
been designed—to address situations of intimate terrorism.
The fit issue is important, but it has been insufficiently scrutinized
as the statutory reach has undergone expansion. The array of
remedies available to victims and offenders of domestic violence are
less effective—i.e., not a good “fit”—when applied to people who are
not involved in an intimate partner relationship. This forced and
improper fit can lead to several problems.
First, it can create remedy confusion. It is well accepted by now
that the classic case of domestic violence—a.k.a. intimate partner
violence or intimate terrorism—centers on control.63 The perpetrator
attempts to coercively control all aspects of the victim’s life. This
explains, among other things, the increased risk of danger to a survivor
when she has left or is in the process of leaving. Shucking the
perpetrator’s bonds can result in the perpetrator increasing, through
violent assault, attempts to control his target.
60

Not all will agree, however, that the scope of domestic violence statutes should
be limited to intimate partners. See Catherine F. Klein & Leslye E. Orloff, Providing
Legal Protection for Battered Women, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 801, 816–18 (1993), where the
authors argue that expanding coverage to include “a wide range of extended family
relationships” is an appropriate reflection of the “reality of American family life.”
61
For example, Maryland has a “Peace Orders” statute. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &
JUD. PROC. §§ 3-150110 (West 2016). Likewise, Massachusetts has a “Harassment
Prevention Orders” statute that is available to anyone who proves that certain acts have
occurred, without need for a special relationship. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 258E,
§ 1 (West 2016).
62
See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
63
See generally EVAN STARK, COERCIVE CONTROL: HOW MEN ENTRAP WOMEN IN
PERSONAL LIFE (INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE) (2009).

DUNLAP (DO NOT DELETE)

786

3/21/2016 12:47 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:775

Further, certain remedies might appear facially appropriate but
are in fact not because of the coercive control that defines intimate
partner abuse. Joint counseling, for instance, is frequently harmful as
it gives the batterer more tools with which to control the survivor.
Likewise, anger management, a remedy still frequently ordered for
perpetrators, has little to do with addressing coercive control. With
roommates, siblings, or parent/children confrontations, on the other
hand, either of these two choices might be helpful. In other words,
Hope Solo might benefit from anger management; Ray Rice or Greg
Hardy will not.
One argument, of course, is to put all possible relationships and
remedies in the statute and let the judge sort out what is appropriate.
There are, however, several problems with this response. First,
protection order proceedings often involve pro se, or self-represented,
litigants. Even if a non-lawyer advocate is available to help the victimsurvivor fill out the protection order form, the risk of selecting an
inappropriate or potentially harmful remedy is high.64 Also, judges
often handle crowded calendars and may lack the time to scrutinize
the remedies sought in the petition. Further, although the judging of
protection order proceedings has improved over the years, due largely
to judicial training and increased public attention,65 not all judges have
the training, time, or temperament to sort it through and get it right.66
Second, including relationships that do not fit even a broad
definition of intimate partner will result in a dilution of resources and
systems capacity. New York Court of Appeals Chief Judge Judith Kaye
raised this concern when the New York legislature was considering
expanding the reach of that state’s protection order statute.67
Although Judge Kaye supported broadening the statute to include
dating relationships, she noted the burden that expanded coverage
would have on the court system and urged appropriations for
additional judges to handle the increased caseload.68 In doing so,
Judge Kaye recognized the need for appropriate expansion, but also
wisely raised concern about having sufficient judicial resources to
64

Many jurisdictions have trained advocates to assist petitioners in completing the
forms necessary for seeking a protection order. These advocates are typically not
trained in the consequences or efficacy of certain legal remedies.
65
See, e.g., Jonathan Lippman, Ensuring Victim Safety and Abuser Accountability:
Reforms and Revisions in New York Courts’ Response to Domestic Violence, 76 ALB. L. REV.
1417, 1430 (2012–2013).
66
JAMES PTACEK, BATTERED WOMEN IN THE COURTROOM 170 (1999).
67
See Cranstoun et al., supra note 51, at 468–69.
68
See id.
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handle the expansion.
The dilution of resources argument should not be used against
persons who should benefit from protection order coverage. It was so
used in 2013, when some opponents of reauthorizing the Violence
Against Women Act (VAWA) argued that the proposed expanded
coverage to gay, lesbian, and Native American communities would
dilute services to others already covered.69 The dilution argument,
however, should not be used to avoid providing services to those
subject to intimate terrorism.
The politics of VAWA aside, it is axiomatic that having additional
persons covered affects the resources available. The solution is to
exclude from protection order coverage those not involved in intimate
relationships, rather than excluding under-served groups, such as gay,
lesbian, and Native American communities. Finite resources should
be conserved for those in the greatest need. Thanks to VAWA,
monetary resources for things such as victims’ services, police training,
service of protection orders, and legal services are dedicated to the
fight against domestic violence. Those resources, however, are far
from infinite. It is therefore critically important to define the problem
carefully and funnel the resources appropriately.70
Another concern that arises from including non-intimate
terrorism cases in the coverage offered by civil protection laws is the
trivialization of intimate terrorism, which may, in turn, undercut
efforts to combat it.
Roommate spats or mother-daughter
arguments—serious though they may be—are not of a kind with
intimate partner domestic violence cases. They are not fueled by
coercive control and would generally score low on any valid lethality
assessment.71
69

See William H. Manz, Introduction to 1 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN
REAUTHORIZATION ACT OF 2013: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAW NO. 113-4, at v, v
(William H. Manz ed., 2014). An attempt to finally approve the VAWA reauthorization
bill was abruptly halted when some members of Congress insisted on removing
provisions that would provide expanded protections for gay and lesbian individuals
who are the victims of domestic abuse. See id. These arguments often were nothing
more than thinly veiled bias. The bill was finally approved on March 7, 2013. Id. at
Doc. No. 1. Interestingly, each reauthorization of VAWA, coming at approximately
four-year intervals, has come up against significant opposition. Is some version of soft
misogyny at work?
70
See, e.g., Kate Pickert, What’s Wrong with the Violence Against Women Act?, TIME
(Feb. 27, 2013), http://nation.time.com/2013/02/27/whats-wrong-with-the-violenceagainst-women-act/.
71
See Press Release, Jeanne Geiger Crisis Center, Jeanne Geiger Crisis Center
Receives Unprecedented Funding to Prevent Domestic Violence Homicides
Throughout the U.S. (Mar. 18, 2013), http://jeannegeigercrisiscenter.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/07/JGCC-Receives-Unprecedented-Funding.pdf. Even with
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Further, the misplacing of non-intimate partner cases within the
domestic violence system can create additional secondary trauma for
those working with survivors.72 This limits the capacity of those working
in the system to respond effectively and compassionately when needed.
This lowered capacity will negatively affect survivors and may
discourage them from further voluntary participation with the system
or cooperating with any involuntary participation.73 In addition to
creating challenges among first responders, having roommate fights
adjudicated under domestic violence statutes could lead to the public
at large trivializing the seriousness of intimate terrorism.
3. Court Interpretations of Statutory Expansion
College dormitory suitemates,74 brothers against sisters,75 brothers
against brothers,76 rooming house residents,77 stepdaughters against
stepmothers,78 unrelated adult in whose home a twenty-year-old is
living against the twenty-year-old’s parents,79 grandmother against
grandchild’s father (de facto son-in-law?),80 woman against ex-brotherin-law81—these are all non-intimate relationships that state courts have
found to fit within the class of persons entitled to seek protective order
relief. This is, at least in part, the result of legislative expansion of the
relationship requirement over the past several decades. Legislatures
have done this to increase protection to those affected by intimate
intimate partner violence, there is a necessary triaging of resources.
72
See Vicarious Trauma, AM. COUNSELING ASS’N, http://www.counseling.org/docs/
trauma-disaster/fact-sheet-9—-vicarious-trauma.pdf (last visited Feb. 29, 2016)
(defining “vicarious trauma,” or “secondary traumatic stress,” as the trauma
experienced by the caregivers of trauma victims).
73
See Laurie S. Kohn, The Justice System and Domestic Violence: Engaging the Case but
Divorcing the Victim, 32 NYU REV. L & SOC. CHANGE 191, 247–50 (2008).
74
Hamilton v. Ali, 795 A.2d 929, 934 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2001).
75
Olivieri v. Olivieri, 678 A.2d 393, 394 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996), overruled by Custer
v. Cochran, 933 A.2d 1050 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007) (going further and disposing of the
single-household requirement of Olivieri).
76
See Jutchenko v. Jutchenko, 660 A.2d 1267, 1268 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995)
(reversing a restraining order between two middle-aged brothers only on the grounds
that they did not live together since reaching adulthood), abrogation recognized in M.P.
v. K.K., No. A-2902-13T4, 2014 WL 7475213 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Jan. 7, 2015)
(stating that Jutchenko’s “‘rationale has been eroded’ and that a more expansive, factsensitive analysis is required”).
77
S.P. v. Newark Police Dep’t, 52 A.3d 178, 189 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2012).
78
Sepesi v. Gorsi, No. WD-02-028, 2003 WL 1702505, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar.
31, 2003).
79
Rzeszutek v. Beck, 649 N.E.2d 673, 674–76 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995).
80
South v. North, 698 A.2d 553, 558 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1997).
81
S.B. v. Z.H., No. A-2802-10T4, 2012 WL 222957, at *1, 3 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. Jan. 26, 2012).
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partner abuse.82 For example, a New Jersey court has said that the
legislature intended to change of the word “cohabitant” to “household
member” in order to “extend protection to any person who has a close
relationship to his or her batterer.”83
a. Household Members
Among the current definitions of the relationship needed to
qualify for protection order relief, the term “household members”
(past or present) is the term most likely to create problems. Courts, in
their efforts to be faithful stewards of legislative intent, have wrestled
with the definition of “household member,” and have come to a variety
of conclusions. Some of those conclusions, however, border on the
absurd.84 Other times though, courts get it right, rejecting, for
instance, the argument that residents of a group home belong to the
class of individuals intended to be protected by domestic violence
protection order statutes.85
Amidst their wrestling, some courts have acknowledged the
remedial and broad legislative intent behind domestic violence
statutes.86 Those courts may understandably feel bound to interpret
the statutes expansively in order to fulfill legislative intent.87 One
court, in interpreting the term “household member” in New Jersey’s
domestic violence protection order statute, declared that the parties
need not reside together, but “more than a casual dating relationship”
was required.88 Despite an expansive reading of the term “household
82

Silva v. Carmel, 7 N.E.3d 1096, 1101 (Mass. 2014).
Hamilton v. Ali, 795 A.2d 929, 930 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2001) (citations
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis removed).
84
See id. at 930 n.1 (citing In re Lovell, 572 N.W.2d 44, 45 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997)
(Fitzgerald, J., dissenting) (regarding college roommates)).
85
Silva, 7 N.E.3d at 1100. Determining who fits within the statutory definition of
household member is challenging enough when a court is focusing on how to apply
the statute in factual situations involving intimate partner abuse.
86
See, e.g., Storch v. Sauerhoff, 757 A.2d 836, 838 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2000).
87
See generally Hamilton, 795 A.2d 929.
88
Desiato v. Abbott, 617 A.2d 678, 680 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1992). In Jutchenko
v. Jutchencko, 660 A.2d 1267 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.1995), abrogation recognized in M.P.
v. K.K., No. A-2902-13T4, 2014 WL 7475213 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Jan. 7, 2015),
the court applied a narrowed definition of “former household member.” The court
said:
Therefore, we do not believe that the Legislature could have intended
the protections of the Act to extend to conduct related to a dispute
between two persons who have not resided together in the same
household for twenty years, at least in the absence of any showing that
the alleged perpetrator’s past domestic relationship with the alleged
victim provides a special opportunity for “abusive and controlling
behavior.”
83
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member,” this interpretation is consistent with the spirit of the law.89
At some point, however, expansive interpretations risk stretching
definitions beyond recognition and can warp a statute’s meaning.90
Explaining this risk, one judge dissented from a determination
that a mother-daughter fight fell within the Michigan law for a penalty
enhancement for domestic assault. The judge argued that just because
a statute targets “domestic” offenders does not mean that “the
Legislature intended . . . to encompass all offenders who resided with
the victim at or before the time of the assault regardless of the
relationship between the offender and the victim.”91 Under the
majority’s reasoning, the dissenting judge noted, “unrelated persons
who reside together solely as college roommates could be charged with
domestic assault . . . . [T]his would be an absurd result.”92 In light of the
statutory purpose, the judge reasoned that the legislature intended the
term “resident of his or her household” to have a romantic
involvement component.93
In Pennsylvania, the appellate courts have struggled with the
residency requirement between adult brothers and sisters.94 In Olivieri
v. Olivieri,95 the Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed the denial of a
protection order between siblings who were in a longstanding business
dispute, even though one sibling had threatened the other.96 In so
doing, the court said:
We agree with the trial court that the Protection From Abuse
Act simply does not apply to the dispute between Maria and
Frank Olivieri. . . . “[T]he Protection from Abuse Act is a
vanguard measure dealing with the problems of wife and
child abuse. It is designed to protect against abuse . . .
between family or household members who reside together
[and] also between unmarried persons living together.”97

Id. at 126869.
89
Desiato, 617 A.2d. at 680.
90
Coleman v. Romano, 908 A.2d 254, 258–59 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2006). In
this case, the court found that there was jurisdiction for a protection order for a
mother against a daughter on the grounds that they were former household members.
New Jersey does not include affinity or consanguinity as a basis for jurisdiction. See id.
91
In re Lovell, 572 N.W.2d 44, 46 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997) (Fitzgerald, J., dissenting).
92
Id. (emphasis added).
93
Id. at 46–47.
94
See, e.g., Olivieri v. Olivieri, 678 A.2d 393, 394–95 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996).
95
Id.
96
Id.; Olivieri v. Olivieri, 32 Phila. Co. Rptr. 460, 462 (Ct. Com. Pl. 1995).
97
Olivieri, 678 A.2d at 394 (alteration in original except the first) (citation
omitted).
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Eleven years later, however, the same court, in Custer v. Cochran,98
affirmed a protection from abuse order between siblings, also
stemming from a family-owned business dispute.99 This time the court
noted that the legislature had removed the requirement that the
abuser reside in the same household with his or her victim.100
b. Intimacy
Courts have also struggled with how to define intimacy or intimate
relationships for the purpose of finding jurisdiction in protection
order cases. A New York family court found that the legislature did not
intend the term “intimate relationship” to include a child and her
mother’s boyfriend.101 The appellate court reversed, finding that this
“quasi-stepparent-stepchild” relationship, in which the child and the
boyfriend were in the same home three weekends a month, was a
“unique or special” relationship of the sort that subjects “persons to
greater vulnerability and potential abuse.”102
In general, both courts and legislatures have worked to ensure
that protection order statutes are broad enough to cover all forms of
intimate partner abuse. Thus, expansions to unmarried couples
accurately reflect the need to protect gay and lesbian victims of
intimate partner abuse. Likewise, expansions to romantic partners
who do not live together, e.g., dating relationships, are warranted.
But what of the over-expansive definitions—either by legislation
or judicial interpretation—that deflect focus from the peculiar
dynamics and dangers of intimate terrorism? Are these examples of
soft misogyny or of implicit bias? While that specific causation may be
less clear here, it is clear that these expanding definitions expose a
misunderstanding of intimate partner violence. And from that
misunderstanding flows a failure to realize the harms that come from
including Hope Solo in the same category as Ray Rice.

98
99
100
101
102

933 A.2d 1050 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007).
Id. at 1051–52.
Id. at 1055.
Jose M. v. Angel V., 951 N.Y.S.2d 195, 197 (App. Div. 2012).
Id. at 199 (citation omitted).
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B. Domestic Violence Reform in the Criminal Justice System
1. Overuse of Criminal Justice System
After years of having domestic violence officially ignored by state
actors, abused women and their advocates welcomed increased
responsiveness by law enforcement.103 Now, however, many observe
that the response to domestic violence has been over-criminalized.104
Some of the critique focuses on the often uneasy alliance between
actors of the criminal justice system and domestic violence survivors.105
Other critical assessment highlights the way in which mandatory
policies denigrate the validity of a survivor’s choice.106
Professor Margaret Drew suggests that the increased use of
criminal procedures has been detrimental to the interaction between
the civil and criminal court systems.107 First, Drew asserts that civil
courts unduly accord leadership and authority to the criminal
proceeding/system.108 In addition, courts and individuals often
misapprehend or misinterpret what happens in the criminal
prosecution, which results in diminishing the survivor’s credibility.109
For instance, Drew notes that if a defendant is found not guilty or the
case is dismissed for lack of prosecution, civil judges often use that
outcome to discredit the survivor’s testimony on the civil side.110 This
is so even though a survivor may not be timely informed of the date of
the criminal trial.111 In sum, Drew argues, cooperation and, ultimately,
103

See generally Donna Coker, Crime Control and Feminist Law Reform in Domestic
Violence Law: A Critical Review, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 801 (2001).
104
See generally LEIGH GOODMARK, A TROUBLED MARRIAGE: DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND
THE LEGAL SYSTEM (2012); Coker, supra note 103; Aya Gruber, The Feminist War on Crime,
92 IOWA L. REV. 741 (2007).
105
Gruber, supra note 104, at 797 n.241 (“This process simultaneously criminalizes
whole populations of lower class, urban males, usually racial minorities, while
discounting the socially destructive behavior of more powerful groups.”) (quoting
Ahmed A. White, Capitalism, Social Marginality, and the Rule of Law’s Uncertain Fate in
Modern Society, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 759, 788 (2005)).
106
See generally Coker, supra note 103.
107
E-mail from Margaret Drew, Professor, Univ. of Mass. Sch. of Law, to author
(Jan. 27, 2015, 9:00 PM) (on file with author).
108
See id. In some states, civil protection order full hearings are continued until
the criminal matter is resolved. That ensures, of course, that the judge will inquire as
to the results on the criminal side. And in states where judges have access to all
criminal records online, the results typically are with the judge before the civil hearing
even begins.
109
See id.
110
Id.
111
Id. Professor Drew describes a client whose first notice of the criminal
proceeding was a subpoena served the night before the scheduled trial. She did not
attend because she could not arrange childcare on such short notice. Her absence
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success in the criminal justice system has become a de facto standard by
which a survivor’s credibility is measured.112
The criminal justice system that is appropriate for stranger
violence—or even acquaintance violence—may not always be the
remedy of choice between former or current intimate partners.
Survivors may want to be free from intimate partner abuse without
turning their batterer into a convicted criminal. The batterer may be
their current or ex-spouse or lover or the father of their children—in
short, someone they once loved. Indeed, it may be someone whom
they still love and with whom they retain hopes for a continued
relationship.113
There are hard choices embedded in every domestic violence
situation. The experiences of the past several decades demonstrate the
value of some solutions and the harm of others. A criminal justice
system one-size-fits-all response has severe limitations.114 Having a
variety of options on the table, rather than overuse of the criminal
justice system, may result in more and safer solutions.
2. Mandatory Arrest
In the early- to mid-1980s, police departments around the country
began to take a different tack when handling domestic violence calls.
After years of according domestic violence calls low priority and, when
responding, trying to be a peacemaker at best and concluding that the
woman must enjoy the battery at worst,115 police departments began
implementing mandatory arrest or pro-arrest policies. Mandatory
arrest policies require police to arrest alleged batterers. Pro-arrest
policies favor arrest as the preferred choice but do not mandate it.
This new police approach to domestic violence arrests coincided
roughly with two distinct events. First, in 1984, a landmark case, which
held a police department liable for not protecting a victim who was
killed by her batterer, motivated other police departments to respond
more appropriately.116 Second, that same year saw the release of a study
was used against her in the civil hearing.
112
Id.
113
See Sally Goldfarb, Reconceiving Civil Protection Orders: Can Law Help End the Abuse
Without Ending the Relationship?, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1487, 1499–1503 (2008).
114
See, e.g., Emily J. Sack, Battered Women and the State: the Struggle for the Future of
Domestic Violence Policy, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 1657, 1675 (2004).
115
See Joan Zorza, Criminal Law of Misdemeanor Domestic Violence, 19701990, 83 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 46, 4750 (1992).
116
See Thurman v. City of Torrington, 595 F. Supp. 1521 (D. Conn. 1984). Sadly,
some thirty years later, another Connecticut town lost a similar lawsuit. See Notice v.
Town of Plainville, 56 Conn. L. Rptr. 640, at *1 (Super. Ct. 2013).
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conducted in Minneapolis, Minnesota that posited beneficial effects
from arresting a batterer at the scene.117
The convergence of these separate events helped elevate the
mandatory arrest movement. States, municipalities, and police
departments rushed to enact mandatory arrest or pro-arrest policies.
These enactments were often supported by advocates for domestic
violence survivors.118
Mandatory arrest or pro-arrest policies also resonated for other
reasons. First, they fit into a trend that adhered to the premise that
domestic violence should not be treated differently, e.g., less seriously,
than stranger violence. So, the theory went: if a stranger would be
arrested, so should an intimate batterer.119 Second, these policies
provided—in that moment at least—safety to the victim. Third, an
arrest, in addition to offering temporary safety, provided a window of
time in which the victim could plan and perhaps execute an escape.120
Finally, mandatory arrests were a way to transmit a strong new
message—to survivor, batterer, and society at large: domestic violence
is no longer to be tolerated, and the state will bring its power to bear
to halt it. In short, together the perceived benefits of mandatory arrest,
the Minnesota mandatory arrest study, and police department
concerns about liability created ripe conditions for mandatory arrest
or pro-arrest policies.
Before long, however, the downsides of these policies grew
apparent. It turned out that the victim’s desire to be safe was not
necessarily matched by an equivalent desire to have the batterer

117

Lawrence W. Sherman & Richard A. Berk, The Specific Deterrent Effects of Arrest for
Domestic Assault, 49 AM. SOC. REV. 261 (1984).
118
This alliance between the battered women’s movement and law enforcement
was, and is often, an uneasy one. Sack, supra note 114. See also Gruber, supra note 104.
Professor Gruber notes the “political and philosophical lines” crossed in the alliance
between feminists and law enforcement. Id. at 747.
119
See Sack, supra note 114, at 1667. The comparison of domestic violence to
stranger violence allowed for additional strange alliances. Treating domestic violence
as one would treat stranger violence has roots in early federal policy regarding “family
violence.” The 1984 U.S. Attorney General’s Task Force on Family Violence, Final
Report, located the concern for the victims of domestic assault in a conservative
concern over crime. Stranger arrest analogy was flawed, of course, because warrantless
arrests—the emerging prime authority for domestic violence arrests—were no more
allowed in stranger violence than domestic violence. See Gruber, supra note 104, at
794.
120
Sack, supra note 114, at 1671. At that time and even, although to a lesser extent,
now, the victim’s leaving was the only societally acceptable response. This is illustrated
by the outrage focused on Janay Palmer, Ray Rice’s then-fiancé, for failing to leave her
abuser.
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arrested.121 In the past, victim-survivors might have been outraged that
their batterers were told to take a walk around the block, but many
were now upset that their batterers were being arrested.122 This could
lead to police being criticized at the scene by the very person they
sought to protect. Quite understandably, none of the actors in this
new drama was happy with the newly rewritten ending.123
In addition to general dissatisfaction at the scene, mandatory
arrest caused at least two other negative outcomes. First, rather
predictably, batterers did not take getting arrested lightly. So, while
survivors were temporarily safe, they might have been at more of a risk
rather quickly, i.e., the next day, when the batterer was released from
jail. Another unanticipated consequence of mandatory arrest was the
dramatic increase of dual arrests at the scene.124 Police officers would
arrive at the scene to hear conflicting stories as to who did what to
whom. Moreover, officers might observe wounds on both parties.125
Therefore, they would arrest both parties, either because it was the
easier course or because they genuinely did not know what other
action to take.
Inappropriate dual arrests have many negative results. Prime
among them is the batterers’ new and rather effective tool against their
survivors: casting them as perpetrators. After a dual arrest, the
survivors are now, in the eyes of the law, wrongdoers in equal measure
121

This could be particularly true in minority communities, where interactions
with police were already tension-fraught. See Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins:
Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241,
1257 (1991).
122
There is, of course, never a universal description of how a victim-survivor will
respond.
123
It seems likely that one reason for negative police attitudes towards domestic
violence victims flowed from this new, negative interaction between victim and officer.
That subject will be explored further, infra Part III.B.2. See Daniel G. Saunders, The
Tendency to Arrest Victims of Domestic Violence: A Preliminary Analysis of Officer Characteristics,
10 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 147, 147 (1995) (“Underlying anti-victim behavior by
the police may be particular attitudes about victims, women in general, and the
acceptability of violence.”).
124
Final Report from David Hirschel et al. to U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Explaining the
Prevalence, Context, and Consequences of Dual Arrest in Intimate Partner Cases iv–v
(Apr. 2007), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/218355.pdf [hereinafter
Final Report]. Hirschel et al.’s report stated:
In addition, while the overall dual arrest rates were low (1.3%), the
existence of a mandatory arrest law significantly increased the likelihood
of dual arrest for all three of the relationship categories (intimate
partner, other domestic, and acquaintance) examined. Thus, this study
provides support for the hypothesis that mandatory arrest laws produce
higher rates of dual arrest in a range of relationship types.
125
An intimate batterer—or anyone committing an assault for that matter—may
end up with defensive wounds inflicted by the victim-survivor.
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to the batterers. The arrests of the survivors could, of course, lead to
their prosecution. The arrests could also lead to the entry of mutual
civil protection orders, the violation of which could have criminal
consequences for the survivor.126
As the ills of dual arrests became apparent, police departments
wisely began to implement training and policy on how to determine
the identity of the primary aggressor.127 Officers at the scene were then
equipped with the skills necessary to discern who was the aggressor. If
they chose to use those skills, they could then arrest that person, rather
than taking the path of least resistance and arresting both.
Moreover, as the problems with mandatory arrests emerged, one
of the core rationales that led to their institution waned. Attempts to
replicate the Minnesota study that had demonstrated positive results
from mandatory arrests failed.128 Hence, the salutary effect behind
mandatory arrests was called into question. The safety of the survivor
is often cited as the most important goal in intimate partner violence
intervention.129 It now appeared that arrest was having, at best, a mixed
impact on survivor safety.130
Further, the idea that crimes of domestic violence could or,
indeed, should be treated like crimes between strangers was being
challenged. That intimate partner abuse is serious and can constitute
a crime is not to be gainsaid. The survivor and the batterer, however,
are not strangers, and the resolution to the crime is unlikely to be the
same as it would be for stranger violence.131
Mandatory arrest or pro-arrest policies led to unanticipated
consequences. Some of those consequences are understandable and,
with hindsight, predictable. Police went from making few arrests to
126

Mutual protection orders—often entered by consent—are not a benign way to
resolve a disputed matter, as some victims may believe. Operating under the notion
that they do not want to see the batterer and certainly have no interest in committing
physical violence, victim-survivors might think that entering consensual mutual
protection orders get them what they need—a stay away order or other appropriate
relief against the batterer—with no cost to themselves. Mutual protection orders,
however, are one way batterers use the legal system to exert control over their victims.
Violations of protection orders are, in all jurisdictions, a separate criminal offense, in
addition to subjecting the violator to contempt of court. See generally Elizabeth Topiffe,
Why Civil Protection Orders are Effective Remedies for Domestic Violence but Mutual Protective
Orders Are Not, 67 IND. L. J. 1039 (1992).
127
See Final Report, supra note 124, at 12.
128
Id. at iv–v.
129
See Sack, supra note 114, at 1678.
130
See id. at 1678–79.
131
Often, the victim-survivor and the batterer have children together, which
creates a life-long tie that renders remedies available in stranger violence cases
ineffectual for intimate terrorism.
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arresting both persons on the scene. These multiple problems with
mandatory arrest have forged a growing consensus among domestic
violence experts against the utility of mandatory arrest, at least in its
present form.132 It is an issue that continues to divide the community,133
and the laws remain in force in many jurisdictions.134 Ultimately,
women want to be safe from their coercive partners but do not wish to
have them incarcerated.
The tensions between police and battered women are not of
recent making.135 Whether one is a proponent or opponent of
mandatory arrest, the embedded soft misogyny is glaring. Wellmeaning police officers might become flummoxed when survivor and
batterer alike oppose arrest. This could in turn feed into compassion
fatigue and help fuel a belief on the part of police that survivors are
not interested in—or worse yet, do not deserve—protection. Officers
frustrated with the survivor not having the “correct” response now were
possessed of a new tool: arrest them both.
3. Mandatory (No-Drop) Prosecution
As policies and laws changed to compel police to arrest accused
batterers,136 so too were efforts to mandate prosecution as well.137 Many
jurisdictions adopted mandatory prosecution policies, sometimes
referred to as “no-drop” policies.138 One reason behind this shift was

132

But see Sack, supra note 114, at 1690. Sack argues that even with all of the
problems associated with mandatory arrest and other mandated criminal justice
policies, a return to discretionary policies would not alleviate the problems but rather
restore the problems of the status quo ante.
133
See generally David Hirschel et al., Domestic Violence and Mandatory Arrest Laws: To
What Extent Do They Influence Police Arrest Decisions, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 255
(2007); G. Kristian Miccio, A House Divided: Mandatory Arrest, Domestic Violence, and the
Conservatization of the Battered Women’s Movement, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 237 (2005).
134
See Domestic Violence Arrest Policies, AM. BAR ASS’N (Mar. 2014),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/domestic_violence1
/Resources/statutorysummarycharts/2014%20Domestic%20Violence%20Arrest%20
Policy%20Chart.authcheckdam.pdf (providing statutory summary charts, listing by
state).
135
See, e.g., Njeri Mathis Rutledge, Turning a Blind Eye: Perjury in Domestic Violence
Cases, 39 N.M. L. Rev. 149, 178–79 (2009).
136
Generally a change of law was required because the arrests were often on
misdemeanor charges, and the common law only permitted arrests for misdemeanors
committed in the presence of police officers. Rarely did batterers commit their crimes
in the presence of law enforcement. Accordingly, criminal laws had to be changed to
allow for arrests in these circumstances. Sack, supra note 114, at 1669–70.
137
Deborah Epstein, Procedural Justice: Tempering the State’s Response to Domestic
Violence, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1843, 1857–58 (2002).
138
Sack, supra note 114, at 1672–73.

DUNLAP (DO NOT DELETE)

798

3/21/2016 12:47 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:775

to prevent intimidation of the survivor.139 After a domestic violence
arrest, prosecutors must decide whether to bring criminal charges. In
many domestic violence cases, the survivor is the primary witness. As a
consequence, a batterer often puts coercive pressure on the survivor
to not cooperate with the prosecution. This pressure, of course,
includes threats of violence or other consequences as a backdrop.140
A primary perceived benefit of no-drop policies, then, was that the
batterer would know that the survivor had no control over “dropping
the charges,” as, indeed, the charges could not be dropped.141 If the
prosecutor owned the case and would go forward regardless of the
survivor’s views, the hope was that the batterer would see the futility in
pressuring the survivor to drop the charges. Another important,
though perhaps more attenuated, hope was that the batterer would
not blame the survivor upon release and thus not administer a severe
punishment for her failure to comply with his edict that she drop the
charges.
Other benefits, too, were thought to flow from no-drop
prosecution policies. They permit the state to demonstrate that it will
vigorously pursue domestic violence cases through its prosecutorial
agency. This sends an important societal response to the question:
“Why do we permit him to batter?” This societal response is: “We
don’t. All batterers will be prosecuted always. No exceptions.”
Although no-drop policies have always been controversial,142 the
criticism of them has been on the rise. One of the significant criticisms
of mandated prosecution is that the system now stands in the stead of
the batterer by imposing its will on the survivor.143 The state’s stripping
of the survivor’s autonomy can lead to dire results. For instance, it is
well acknowledged that it takes a victim multiple attempts to leave
before the leaving sticks.144 The ability to leave permanently may be
139

Donna Wills, Domestic Violence: The Case for Aggressive Prosecution, 7 UCLA
WOMEN’S L.J. 173, 179–80 (1997).
140
The threat of violence may be implicit, based on prior violence or threats
thereof. Remember that coercive control is the goal of the batterer; it is possible that
that control can be carried out from jail. Id. at 179.
141
Sack, supra note 114, at 1673.
142
See, e.g., Angela Corsilles, No-Drop Policies in the Prosecution of Domestic Violence
Cases: Guarantee to Action or Dangerous Solution?, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 853, 876 (1994).
143
See Thomas L. Kirsch II, Problems in Domestic Violence: Should Victims Be Forced to
Participate in the Prosecution of Their Abusers?, 7 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 383, 415
(2001). See also Coker, supra note 103, at 813.
144
Stoever, supra note 37, at 33031. Rarely does any attempt at change succeed
at first effort. The reality that relapse is part of recovery, for instance, is by now wellknown. Further, leaving may not always be the action that the victim-survivor is striving
for or that is best for her. See Angela R. Gover et al., When Abuse Happens Again: Women’s
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aided by services or protection offered by the state.145
Unfortunately, however, the system’s manhandling of the survivor
may impede her making a future successful effort to leave if that effort
requires help from state actors. The way in which a victim-survivor is
treated by police and prosecutorial personnel may dictate whether she
voluntarily seeks their help again. If police presence on the scene is
not a result of the survivor’s choice, e.g., a call from neighbors or
bystanders,146 the police and prosecutorial response may influence
whether the survivor cooperates or is hostile.
Aside from the issue of how the survivor is treated by first
responders and the impact that treatment has on survivors, a
mandatory prosecution policy telegraphs to survivors that the
prosecutor knows best. A survivor’s valid concerns about safety, the
batterer’s capacity to maintain employment, or the possibility of
deportation fall on officially deaf ears in the case of no-drop policies.147
So, always pursuing prosecution against the survivor’s wishes may put
her, and perhaps her children, at increased risk in any number of ways.
Further, and more controversially, a survivor may be against
prosecution for reasons that are deemed less compelling: a survivor
simply may want to move on or may want to keep her job, with which
one or more court appearances may interfere. Even in those
circumstances, where safety may not be so obviously in play, forcing
prosecution against a survivor’s will silences her voice and continues to
force her into a submissive role.

Reasons for Not Reporting New Incidents of Intimate Partner Abuse to Law Enforcement, 23
WOMEN & CRIM. JUST. 99, 114 (2013), http://mysite.du.edu/~adeprinc/
goverweltonetal2013.pdf (“Therefore, many abused women are making a conscious
decision that the quality of life for themselves and their children would be negatively
impacted by their efforts to engage the system.”). See also Alexandra Pavlidakis,
Mandatory Arrest: Past Its Prime, 49 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1201, 1204 (2009) (“A woman
may choose not [sic] leave her batterer for a number of reasons. She may have a desire
to keep her family intact, have a strong emotional attachment to her batterer, or be
unable to leave for economic or financial reasons.”).
145
JOHNSON, supra note 37, at 54.
146
See, e.g., Nancy Cohen, Training Men and Women on Campus to ‘Speak Up’ to Prevent
Rape, NPR (Apr. 30, 2014, 3:31 AM), http://www.npr.org/2014/04/30/308058438/
training-men-and-women-on-campus-to-speak-up-to-prevent-rape (reporting that the
White House recommends ways to prevent sexual assault and relationship violence on
college campuses through, among other things, “bystander intervention”).
147
Some jurisdictions have “soft” no-drop policies, which are essentially a strong
preference for proceeding with prosecution but which do permit prosecutors the
discretion not to proceed under some circumstances. See Cheryl Hanna, No Right to
Choose: Mandated Victim Participation in Domestic Violence Prosecutions, 109 HARV. L. REV.
1849, 1863 (1996); Kirsch II, supra note 143, at 386.
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An extreme example of the state actively coercing the survivor by
means of a no-drop policy occurs when the state subpoenas an
unwilling survivor and takes coercive measures—such as the threat or
actuality of jail—to enforce the subpoena.148 Survivors also have been
prosecuted for perjury for recanting the version of events they told at
the scene.149 The solution is not to ignore perjury, to be sure; rather,
the solution is to not put survivors in the position where their testimony
is at odds with prior statements.150
The soft misogyny in mandatory prosecution is obvious. Survivors
receive this message: Father (the state) knows best. Women cannot be
trusted to make decisions,151 and the system, through its prosecutors,
must do it for them. Further, one cannot discount that police and
prosecutorial frustration with survivors who do not comply with
traditional criminal justice processes may be an underlying motivation
for some mandatory prosecution policies. In those cases, the misogyny
might not be so soft.
4. Battered Women’s Syndrome
Current legal theory regarding defenses for survivors who kill
their abusers has evolved since the trial of Francine Hughes in 1977.152
In a case later placed into the national spotlight by the book and
movie, The Burning Bed, Ms. Hughes killed her ex-husband following
twelve years of abuse.153 The case captured so much attention because
Ms. Hughes set fire to the bed in which her husband was sleeping.154
Her lawyer relied on a defense of temporary insanity, and Ms. Hughes
was acquitted.155 Although it garnered significant attention, the

148

Kirsch II, supra note 143, at 402.
Njeri Mathis Rutledge, Turning a Blind Eye: Perjury in Domestic Violence Cases, 39
N.M. L. REV. 149, 153–57 (2009).
150
Id. at 19294.
151
Some suggest instituting guardianship proceedings against abused women.
Ruth Jones, Guardianship for Coercively Controlled Battered Women: Breaking the Control of
the Abuser, 88 GEO. L.J. 605, 609, 628–29 (2000).
152
Faith McNulty, Michigan Woman Acquitted in Ex-Husband’s Slaying, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 4, 1977, at 14.
153
Id.
154
See Louise Knott Ahern, “The Burning Bed”: A Turning Point in Fight Against
Domestic Violence, LANSING ST. J., http://www.lansingstatejournal.com/story/news/
local/2014/10/27/burning-bed-domestic-violence/16224277/ (last visited Feb. 24,
2016). The case has had staying power. See Susan Grigsby, ‘The Burning Bed,’ 30 Years
Later.
And Ray Rice, Now, DAILY KOS (Sept. 14, 2014, 9:20 AM),
http://www.dailykos.com/story/2014/09/14/1328420/—The-Burning-Bed-30-yearslater-And-Ray-Rice-now#.
155
McNulty, supra note 152.
149
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Hughes case, and others involving sleeping abusers,156 are atypical in
that they involve women killing their abusive husbands while not
amidst an immediate confrontation.157 In the vast majority of cases in
which an abuse victim kills her batterer, it is during an active
confrontation.158
A successful self-defense claim requires both a threat of death or
grievous bodily harm and imminence.159 These factors are likely to be
present in the more typical case. It is, however, in only the unusual
cases, such as Hughes, that self-defense may not be available due to the
perceived lack of imminent fear of death or grave bodily harm.160 The
development of the battered women syndrome (BWS) expanded the
possibility of this defense option for women defendants by helping to
demonstrate imminence.161 The defense provides a mechanism for
expert testimony that helps survivors of intimate terrorism to
demonstrate to the jury how the danger was, in fact, imminent.162
BWS is neither a defense nor a syndrome, notwithstanding its
common pairing with those terms.163 It typically refers to a cluster of
symptoms experienced by abused women, such as hyper-vigilance and
learned helplessness.164 It can be used at trial through the admission
of expert testimony that explains to the jury why a battered woman
would have behaved in a particular manner. Without the expert
testimony, a jury may not have the information necessary to
understand why the behavior makes sense in context of an abusive

156

See, e.g., State v. Norman, 378 S.E.2d 8, 9–10 (N.C. 1989).
See Holly Maguigan, Battered Women and Self-Defense: Myths and Misconceptions in
Current Reform Proposal, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 379, 397–98 (1991). At least seventy percent
of women who kill their abusers do so during an active confrontation. Id. at 398 n.69.
158
Id.
159
See Self-Defense, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009); Self-Defense, WEST’S
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW (2nd ed. 2008).
160
Katelyn E. Keegan, Note, The True Man & the Battered Woman: Prospects for GenderNeutral Narratives in Self-Defense Doctrines, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 259, 267–68 (2013). See also
id. at 270 (“Generally, the law considers BWS as a psychological condition apart from
other legal defenses.”).
161
CYNTHIA K. GILLESPIE, JUSTIFIABLE HOMICIDE: BATTERED WOMEN, SELF-DEFENSE
AND THE LAW 93 (1989) (“The ultimate question in a self-defense case is whether the
defendant’s act was a reasonable one. Even if she can successfully negotiate the legal
hurdles of seriousness, imminence, retreat, and the like, she must still convince the
jury of two things: that her belief that she was in imminent danger of death or serious
injury was reasonable under the circumstances and that her response to that perceived
danger was a reasonable one, not an overreaction.”).
162
Jane K. Stoever, Transforming Domestic Violence Representation, 101 KY. L.J. 483, 507
(2013).
163
LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME 7 (1984).
164
Id.
157
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relationship.165
For many years following its 1979 introduction, courts routinely
excluded evidence of BWS. The reasons for exclusion included the
argument that BWS lacked scientific credibility.166 Over a series of years
and hard-fought battles, it is now admissible in nearly all states.167 Thus,
in theory at least, abused women have an increased chance of
demonstrating to fact finders that the homicide of their batterer was
justified. Admissible evidence, however, does not make an acquittal.
Even now, when evidence regarding BWS is admissible, its use is often
unsuccessful.168 This lack of success captures the suspicion that often
accompanies battered women, the legitimacy of their stories, and their
predicament. To augment successful outcomes for battered women,
advocates looked for other avenues to achieve relief and mounted
clemency or pardon campaigns on behalf of many imprisoned
battered women.169
Abused women have a long history of being disbelieved or
discredited.170 First, as part of the coercive control exercised by
abusers, abused women are told they are imagining things or making
things up.171 Worse yet, their batterers tell them that no one will believe
their accusations.172 Law Professor Sarah Buel, a former prosecutor
and survivor of intimate terrorism, recounts chillingly how she stood
in a laundromat, having escaped from her abusive husband, who found
her and had come to claim her.173 “Call the police,” she urged those in
the laundromat, “this man caused these bruises on my face.” “No,
don’t call,” he responded to those present, “she is my wife.” No one

165

See generally Mary Helen Wimberly, Law Student Competition Submission,
Defending Victims of Domestic Violence Who Kill Their Batterers: Using the Trial Expert to
Change Social Norms, AM. BAR ASS’N (2007), http://www.americanbar.org/content/
dam/aba/migrated/domviol/docs/Wimberly.authcheckdam.pdf.
166
See David L. Faigman, Note, The Battered Woman Syndrome and Self-Defense: A Legal
and Empirical Dissent, 72 VA. L. REV. 619, 633–36 (1986).
167
See Janet Parrish, Trend Analysis: Expert Testimony on Battering and Its Effects in
Criminal Cases, 11 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 75, 83–86 (1996).
168
See Emily J. Sack, From the Right of Chastisement to the Criminalization of Domestic
Violence: A Study in Resistance to Effective Policy Reform, 32 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 31, 38–47
(2009).
169
See Sarah M. Buel, Effective Assistance of Counsel for Battered Women Defendants: A
Normative Construct, 26 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 217, 317–19 (2003).
170
See Stoever, supra note 162, at 509.
171
This is sometimes referred to as “gaslighting.” What is Gaslighting?, THE NAT.
DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE
HOTLINE
(last
updated
May
29,
2014),
http://www.thehotline.org/2014/05/what-is-gaslighting/.
172
See, e.g., DEFENDING OUR LIVES (Cambridge Documentary Films 1993).
173
Id.
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called.174 Thus, it is no stretch to imagine how, at some point, abused
women might begin to wonder what alternative universe they live in,
or if what they believe to be true is not in fact true. The process of
being constantly told that no one will believe you inevitably takes its
toll.
More significantly, society has been caught up in batterers’
campaigns to discredit women. Whether the reasons are a by-product
of soft misogyny or are more pernicious, they too have taken their toll.
The occurrence of domestic violence works its way into culture
through news venues and popular media alike.175 While ostensibly
condemning domestic violence, media portrayals of survivors often are
not positive.176 And, indeed, abused women do not comply by being
the “perfect victim.” They come with all manner of human failings and
do not necessarily invite sympathy. Batterers, on the other hand, are
often persuasive and charming.177 Their charm, after all, may be what
initially attracted the victim.
BWS theories helped initiate further study of battered women.
The theories gave defense counsel and their abused clients a way to
explain attacks on their abusers. Eventually, however, the theories and
methodology both came under attack.178
Further research
demonstrated that many abused women are resistors, not helpless
women.179 They are survivors, not victims. Furthermore, they are
neither mentally ill, nor deserving of a “syndrome” label.
Moreover, the phrase “battered women syndrome” has itself been
criticized. First, the stereotypical characteristics it brings to mind have
been refuted, are outdated, or are simply too limited to be accurate.180
174

Id.
See generally Jarrett Bell, Video Surfaces of Ray Rice’s Domestic Violence Incident, USA
TODAY (Sept. 8, 2014, 11:27 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/nfl/
ravens/2014/09/08/ray-rice-tmz-video-roger-goodell/15272689/; Eric Moskowitz,
Jared Remy Pleads Guilty to Murder of Jennifer Martel, THE BOSTON GLOBE (May 27, 2014),
http://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2014/05/27/jared-remy-due-woburncourtroom-today-latest-hearing-jennifer-martel-murder-case/QRd1y01jtYj
ZFPtZccI9VN/story.html; Hilary Russ, Cape Doctor Cleared in Fatal Shooting, CAPE COD
TIMES (Aug. 18, 2007, 2:00 AM), http://www.capecodtimes.com/article/20070818/
NEWS/708180334.
176
Sack, supra note 114, at 165859.
177
Lundy Bancroft, Understanding the Batterers in Custody and Visitation Disputes,
BANCROFT,
http://www.lundybancroft.com/articles/understanding-theLUNDY
batterer-in-custody-and-visitation-disputes (last visited Jan. 7, 2016).
178
See Stoever, supra note 162, at 508.
179
See generally EDWARD W. GONDOLF & ELLEN R. FISHER, BATTERED WOMEN AS
SURVIVORS: AN ALTERNATIVE TO TREATING LEARNED HELPLESSNESS 91, 93 (1988).
180
It has been urged that the term should be abandoned because it “fails to
adequately convey the nature and breadth of scientific knowledge available about
175
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Further, its wording is exclusive and would eliminate its effective use
in gay male relationships. Some states have recognized these
This criticism
shortcomings and have adopted new labels.181
notwithstanding, the phrase seems firmly entrenched in the lexicon.
There is soft misogyny in the development, use, and misuse of the
term “battered women’s syndrome.” While its efforts to explain the
effects of battering were intended to help achieve a better
understanding of the battering phenomenon, it did so by diminishing
women, their strength, and their resolve. This diminishment
dovetailed nicely with existing patriarchal views. Moreover, there is
not much other than misogyny—hard or soft—to explain why women
who kill their batterers receive longer sentences than do men who kill
intimate partners.182
C. Reforms Regarding Children
1. Introduction
The effect of violence on children is well-documented.183 There
exists an obvious risk of harm to children warriors, children otherwise
exposed to war zones, and children living day-to-day in violent
neighborhoods.184 What is obvious now, however, was not so apparent
in the early days of the family law system’s approach to domestic
violence. For years, domestic violence survivors and their advocates
argued unsuccessfully that domestic violence had a profound impact
on children who lived in close proximity to it. Finally, in the 1990s,
courts began to officially recognize the impact of adult intimate
battering and its effects.” Carrie Hempel, Battered and Convicted: One State’s Efforts to
Provide Effective Relief, 25 CRIM. JUST., Winter 2011, at 24, 26 (citing U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE
& U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., NCJ 160972, THE VALIDITY AND USE OF
EVIDENCE CONCERNING BATTERING AND ITS EFFECTS IN CRIMINAL TRIALS: REPORT
RESPONDING TO SECTION 40507 OF THE VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ACT (May 1996),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/batter.pdf).
181
See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 1107 (West 2015) (referring to “intimate partner
battering” and its effects).
182
See James Alan Fox & Marianne W. Zawitz, Homicide Trends in the United States,
BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., http://bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/htius.pdf (last visited Jan. 25,
2010).
183
See generally Deseriee Kennedy, From Collaboration to Consolidation: Developing a
More Expansive Model for Responding to Family Violence, 20 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 1
(2013). But see Dunlap, Motherless Child, supra note 26, at 583 (discussing how such
documentation of harm to children can be misused).
184
See generally KAETHE WEINGARTEN, COMMON SHOCK: WITNESSING VIOLENCE EVERY
DAY: HOW WE ARE HARMED, HOW WE CAN HEAL (2003). See also Erwin Randolph
Parson, Inner City Children of Trauma: Urban Violence Traumatic Stress Response Syndrome
(U-VTS) and Therapists’ Responses, in COUNTERTRANSFERENCE IN THE TREATMENT OF PTSD
151, 157 (John P. Wilson & Jacob D. Lindy eds., 1994).
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violence on the children around it.185 About that time, sociologists
were uncovering data about the effects of intimate abuse on
children.186 In response, courts began considering information
regarding domestic violence when making child custody decisions.187
This was often as a result of legislative changes in custody laws.
2. Failure-to-Protect Charges
A parent has a legal obligation to protect a child from abuse. The
parent (or person acting in loco parentis) must take reasonable
measures to protect the child from harm.188 The parent’s culpability
does not occur any time there is injury to a child, as parental
responsibility is not a strict liability obligation; rather, culpability
attaches when the parent fails to act reasonably to protect the child from
injury.189 A cause of action for failure-to-protect has long existed in the
child abuse and neglect/child dependency sphere.190
The typical failure-to-protect case targets an “observing parent”
who watches on as another person injures a child. The other person
could be the other parent or an intimate partner of the observing
parent. In 1987, the New York City death of six-year-old Lisa Steinberg
brought the concept of failure-to-protect into the public eye in a sad
and sensational way. Lisa was beaten to death by her lawyer father, Joel
Steinberg.191 Her mother, Hedda Nussbaum, failed to protect her
while Steinberg administered many beatings. Both Steinberg and
Nussbaum were arrested and charged with second-degree murder. It
was quickly revealed that Nussbaum had been subjected to extreme
185

Dunlap, Motherless Child, supra note 26, at 568–72.
BETSY MCALISTER GROVES, CHILDREN WHO SEE TOO MUCH: LESSONS FROM THE
CHILD WITNESS TO VIOLENCE PROJECT 54 (2003) (“Services for the children of battered
women began to grow in the early 1990s.”).
187
See Naomi R. Cahn, Civil Images of Battered Women: The Impact of Domestic Violence
on Child Custody Decisions, 44 VAND. L. REV. 1041, 1062 (1991) (explaining that state
courts and legislatures have recently begun to incorporate domestic violence into
custody decisions); see also Lindsay Cadwallader, Mandating Batterers’ Treatment Programs
as a Condition to Granting Custody or Visitation Rights to Batterers, 14 PROB. L.J. 1, 11 (1997)
(“Many state legislatures have . . . reform[ed] existing custody and visitation legislation
to include consideration of domestic violence. Most states either require that courts
consider domestic violence as a factor in custody decisions or create a presumption
against awarding custody to batterers.”).
188
Dunlap, Motherless Child, supra note 26, at 581.
189
See id.
190
See Jeanne A. Fugate, Who’s Failing Whom?: A Critical Look at Failure-to-Protect Laws,
76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 272, 278 (2001) (“Since the first failure-to-protect case was tried forty
years ago, states have codified the duty to protect.”).
191
The question of whether Nussbaum should have been legally excused divided
many who work to combat domestic violence.
186
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intimate terrorism at the hands of Steinberg. Steinberg’s violence
made Nussbaum fear for her life192 and at least partially accounted for
Nussbaum’s failure to protect Lisa. In exchange for agreeing to testify
against Steinberg, criminal charges against Nussbaum were dropped.193
In addition to the foregoing “traditional” form of a failure-toprotect charge, where an observing parent is unwilling or unable to
protect a child from the abuse of another, a new version of a failureto-protect claim has arisen based on the notion that exposure to
domestic violence per se harms children.194
Not long after the hard-fought recognition that witnessing
domestic violence can harm children, child protective services
agencies began to use allegations of this harm against abused women
themselves. Of particular note, the Administration for Children’s
Services in New York City charged many battered women with failure
to protect their children if the children had witnessed or had otherwise
been exposed to the intimate terrorism of their mothers.195 In contrast
to the Steinberg case, these charges were brought when the children
were not physically harmed and even at times when the children were
not physically present during their mothers’ abuse.196 Not only were
charges brought, but also in nearly all circumstances, the children were
removed from their homes—in some cases while their mothers were
still in the hospital recovering from their wounds of domestic
violence.197 New York City argued that a woman who was abused in
front of her children was considered to have caused per se harm that
renders her legally culpable.
Assuming arguendo that children suffer harm stemming from
their exposure to abuse,198 the person being accused of causing that
harm was the domestic violence victim, not the perpetrator.199 In short,
192

Steinberg’s reign of terror over Nussbaum was so great that when Steinberg was
released from jail twenty years later, she was still afraid of him. See generally HEDDA
NUSSBAUM, SURVIVING INTIMATE TERRORISM (2005).
193
See Ronald Sullivan, Steinberg Companion Willing to Testify in Girl’s Death, N.Y.
TIMES (May 9, 1988), http://www.nytimes.com/1988/05/09/nyregion/steinbergcompanion-willing-to-testify-in-girl-s-death.html.
194
Nicholson v. Williams, 203 F. Supp. 2d 153, 197–98 (E.D.N.Y. 2002).
195
See, e.g., id. at 173–75.
196
See, e.g., Dunlap, Motherless Child, supra note 26, at 611 n.300 (citing In re CA.S.,
828 A.2d 184, 191–92 (D.C. 2003)).
197
Nicholson, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 16970.
198
No one doubts that exposure to adult domestic violence is harmful, but the
nature and extent of that harm is very case specific. See Dunlap, Motherless Child, supra
note 26, at 570.
199
From time to time, the batterer would also be charged but the lasting impact
was most often against the mother, from whose custody the children were generally
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the mother was being held legally responsible because she did nothing
to prevent her own abuse. This is vastly different from the
circumstance in which a mother fails to intervene to stop the physical
abuse of her children. And even in those cases, the mother’s choice
may be a protective one, based on an experienced assessment that her
intervention will only increase the resulting harm.
New York City’s Administration for Children’s Services finally put
a halt to this practice after a class action lawsuit found it to be illegal.200
Those in child welfare vowed to be more sensitive to the plight of the
adult victim. Some agencies even placed domestic violence specialists
within child protection offices.201 These more enlightened efforts seem
to have slacked off, and still, the call to child welfare authorities may
be the first call that the police make from the scene of an incident of
intimate terrorism. This bureaucratic response fails to account for the
harm caused by removing children.202 Thus, battered women and their
children remain subject to pitiless double abuse.203
Of course, child protection agencies are mandated to protect
children. But the practice of bringing failure-to-protect charges
against battered women often harms the children as well.204 They are
removed from their homes, generally without explanation, and may be
sent to live with strangers in a foster home or, worse yet, placed in a
group home or other congregate care facility pending the location of
a foster home. The children may be separated from their siblings,
switched out of their schools, and/or forced to endure any number of
disabling consequences in addition to removal from their primary
caregiver. Legally, the mother and child become adversaries, each
represented by his or her own lawyer, all in the name of child
protection and at the battered woman’s expense. Soft misogyny is the
generous assessment.
3. Child Custody
The acknowledgement of the impact that witnessing domestic
violence can have on a child also occurs in child custody cases.
Obviously, custody disputes are much more common than stateinitiated failure-to-protect charges. For many years, however, intimate
removed and who had to jump through many hoops—imposed by the agency “just
because it could,” to get the children back. Nicholson, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 216.
200
Justine A. Dunlap, Judging Nicholson: An Assessment of Nicholson v. Scoppetta,
82 DENV. U. L. REV. 671, 672 (2005).
201
See Dunlap, Motherless Child, supra note 26, at 593.
202
See id. at 584.
203
Nicholson, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 163.
204
See Dunlap, Motherless Child, supra note 26, at 585–86.
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partner violence was not considered relevant to custody
determinations. Among the successes of the fathers’ rights movement
was convincing courts and others that violence by one adult toward
another adult in the home was immaterial to the issue of who received
custody.205
All states now have case law or statutory authority that permits or
requires a judge to take into account domestic violence by one adult
against another in the household.206 Gone are the days when a judge
would sustain a relevance objection against a party attempting to
introduce evidence of intimate terrorism during a custody dispute.
As a theoretical development, it is sound law and policy for courts
to take into account that one parent is an abuser while awarding
custody and, generally, to hold this against the batterer when
rendering the custodial decision. The devil, however, is indeed in the
details, and the ways in which these changes in custody laws play out
varies greatly, both de jure and de facto. Several issues are considered
below.
First, what must the abuse survivor show in order for intimate
partner abuse to be taken into account during the custody proceeding?
A common standard requires the abuse survivor to demonstrate a
pattern of abuse or a serious incident of abuse. Next, how does the
abuse survivor prove this pattern or serious incident? Ideally, the
mother should not have to relive the abuse by having to prove it a
second time after having first established it in a protection
proceeding.207 In some states, however, the existence of a protection
order is not sufficient for a judge to accord a custodial presumption to
the person protected.208
205

See Joan S. Meier, Domestic Violence, Child Custody, and Child Protection:
Understanding Judicial Resistance and Imagining the Solutions, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC.
POL’Y & L. 657, 671–75 (2003).
206
Cahn, supra note 187.
207
The system is replete with examples of how the legal system is indifferent or
even actively hostile to the battered woman. See Leigh Goodmark, Law Is the Answer?
Do We Know That for Sure?; Questioning the Efficacy of Legal Interventions for Battered Women,
23 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 7, 21–28 (2004).
208
See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 209A, § 3(d) (West 2015) (codifying a
rebuttable presumption against custody to the abuser, but also providing that:
[f]or the purposes of this section, the issuance of an order or orders
under chapter 209A shall not in and of itself constitute a pattern or
serious incident of abuse; nor shall an order or orders entered ex parte
under said chapter 209A be admissible to show whether a pattern or
serious incident of abuse has in fact occurred; provided, however, that
an order or orders entered ex parte under said chapter 209A may be
admissible for other purposes as the court may determine, other than
showing whether a pattern or serious incident of abuse has in fact
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While it is reasonable to ensure that the evidence is accurate, it is
just as important to be aware of the ways in which the batterer uses the
legal system to continue his coercive control against the survivor.209
Batterers are likely to use the court system as an extended tool in their
efforts to continue to exert control over their victims.210 Abusers are
twice as likely to contest custody as non-abusers.211 It is the custody
judge’s obligation to do everything that he or she can to halt this
continued abuse. Judges must be educated about the misinformation
spread about how mothers “game the system” by falsely alleging prior
abuse in order to secure an advantage in custody cases.212 Even though
this notion is largely untrue, the perception remains. Sometimes those
already thinking the worst of battered women hold this view,213 and
sometimes those who believe themselves to be more neutrally situated
hold it.214
Finally, assuming that evidence demonstrating a pattern or
serious incident of abuse is available and admissible, do judges use it
properly? Do they analyze this evidence and apply it appropriately?215
If the laws on the books are not being implemented properly, then
they are of little use.216
occurred; provided further, that the underlying facts upon which an
order or orders under said chapter 209A was based may also form the
basis for a finding by the probate and family court that a pattern or
serious incident of abuse has occurred).
209
Mary Przekop, One More Battleground: Domestic Violence, Child Custody, and the
Batterers’ Relentless Pursuit of Their Victims Through the Courts, 9 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 1053,
1061 (2011).
210
Dana Harrington Conner, Abuse and Discretion: Evaluating Judicial Discretion in
Custody Cases Involving Violence Against Women, 17 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 163,
187 n.97 (2009) (quoting Linda C. Neilson, Assessing Mutual Partner-Abuse Claims in
Child Custody and Access Cases, 42 FAM. CT. REV. 411, 420 (2004)).
211
Rita Smith & Pamela Coukos, Fairness and Accuracy in Evaluations of Domestic
Violence and Child Abuse in Custody Determinations, 36 JUDGES’ J. 38, 39 (1997).
212
Both Massachusetts and Arizona have “Battered Mothers’ Testimony Projects”
that have revealed some of the challenges battered mothers face in court custody
battles. See generally Carrie Cuthbert et al., Battered Mothers Speak Out: A Human Rights
Report on Domestic Violence and Child Custody in the Massachusetts Family Courts, AMNESTY
INTERNATIONAL
USA’S
WOMEN’S
RIGHTS
PROGRAM
(Nov.
2002),
https://www.wcwonline.org/vmfiles/execsumm4.pdf; Diane Post & Ariz. Coal.
Against Domestic Violence, Arizona Battered Mothers Testimony Project, BATTERED WOMEN,
BATTERED
CHILDREN,
CUSTODY
ABUSE
(Jan.
19,
2010),
http://ncmbts.blogspot.com/2010/01/arizona-battered-mothers-testimony.html.
213
See Meier, supra note 205, at 686.
214
For example, while working in a legal services office, a student of the author
formed the belief that many of the women seeking protection orders were doing so
solely to obtain an advantage in pending or subsequent custody litigation.
215
See Conner, supra note 210, at 207–08.
216
Id. at 200.
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Soft misogyny runs throughout the issues of intimate partner
abuse and child custody. Reforms allowing the consideration of
evidence of intimate partner abuse are surely beneficial—a wellintended start. But these reforms remain far from reaching their
potential. Judicial resistance to a fuller understanding of the dynamics
of intimate partner abuse, and its effects on children is inexcusable.
IV. CONCLUSION
Why does abuse of women by their intimate partners elude
positive efforts toward eradication? Abuse of women is indeed
grounded in centuries of tradition—centuries in which women were
legally irrelevant. But for this time and place, efforts to eradicate it
have failed. It has been reduced, yes, but outrageous examples still
abound.
There is progress to be seen in many of the changes in the
criminal law system’s arrest and prosecution laws and policies. Many
of these “reforms,” however, have either gone too far by exerting their
own version of coercive control or have aggressively asserted their
superiority as the proper recourse of choice.217
Likewise, the changes in child custody laws, policies, and attitudes
when intimate terrorism is involved are intended to help—and
sometimes do help—survivors and their children. Acknowledging the
presence and relevance of domestic violence in a child custody case is
a necessary start. But inartfully or reactively drawn laws and resistance
to or misapplication of well-crafted legislation significantly undercut
progress, perhaps leading to further discounting of abused women’s
narratives.
The efforts to help protect domestic violence victims by
expanding the class of persons included within the scope of civil
protection order laws are appropriate and overdue when the
expansion covers those in intimate relationships with their abusers.
But over-expansion to include college roommates or first cousins
dilutes resources and—more significantly—creates a mismatch of
remedies. Also, developing legal theories and permitting expert
testimony to explain how domestic violence survivors reasonably
respond to threats that are literally incomprehensible to others are
useful developments until they are distorted and misused against the
victim-survivors that they are intended to aid.
217

Funding through VAWA has contributed to this overextension of the criminal
justice system in resolving intimate partner abuse. See Margaret E. Johnson, Changing
Course in the Anti-domestic Violence Legal Movement: From Safety to Security, 60 VILL. L. REV
145, 161 (2015).
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How, in short, in the name of progress, have there been so many
missteps and misfires, and so much backlash?218 One answer is
relatively benign: unintended consequences happen. Sometimes, they
even happen a lot. Survivors, legislators, judges, lawyers, and other
advocates cannot possibly anticipate all the ways in which forward
movement might sometimes go awry.219
The inevitability of
unanticipated consequences, however, does not grant a free pass to
legislators and those in search of legislative reform to proceed in haste
without thorough consideration of the consequences of their
actions.220 Sometimes legislation can be rushed through in an effort to
resolve a perceived problem in the public spotlight.221 It is likely that
less reactive and more deliberative lawmaking will make for fewer
unanticipated consequences.
Another path to understanding these unfortunate consequences
relies on something deeper and more challenging: the presence of soft
misogyny. Of course, there are still straight-out misogynists whose
hateful screed can easily be dismissed or laid bare—pure and simple.
But that known hatred is easier to combat because it is obvious.222
Misogyny without misogynists. An implicit bias against women.
This possibility must be considered as a way to explain why so many
“reforms” have been turned against intimate terrorism survivors.
New reforms will be instituted. Will those reforms also result in
unanticipated consequences? Will they be tarnished by soft misogyny?
Of course they will; that is inevitable. The soft misogyny borne of
implicit bias will be nigh on impossible to erase. This is because it
occurs without conscious awareness. Therefore, we must first name it
in order to have a chance at defeating it. Once it is named,
opportunities arise. By naming it, we acknowledge and make real its
218

Backlash is not a new phenomenon to the battered women’s movement. See
Sack, supra note 114, at 1699.
219
After all, “[t]he road to Hell is paved with good intentions.” HENRY G. BOHN, A
HAND-BOOK OF PROVERBS 514 (AMS Press 1968).
220
See Jill Lepore, Baby Doe, THE NEW YORKER (Feb. 1, 2016),
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2016/02/01/baby-doe 2/1/16.
Lepore
writes of the scandal-reform cycle that has dominated the child protection system. The
intimate partner abuse system has its own problematic cycle of crisis-reform. A highpublicity domestic violence incident often fuels cries for reform. Some of the
demanded reforms may be unnecessary or even harmful; but that is obvious only after
considered reflection. Other times, reform may be wise but should done thoughtfully,
not reactively. Id.
221
See Dunlap, supra note 22, at 22–28 (discussing GPS legislation enacted quickly
after high-profile intimate partner murders in Kentucky and Illinois).
222
To say that direct misogyny is easier to combat is not to suggest that it is any less
harmful or that it should continue; rather, it is merely a recognition of the more subtle
challenges presented by soft misogyny.
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presence. By naming it and then going a step further to understand
and counter it, we have the hope of moving toward a new
understanding of soft misogyny’s perverse effects. By naming it,
perhaps we will create the willingness to listen honestly to survivors,
rather than twist and discount their narratives so that they fit into our
own misunderstandings.223 By naming it, perhaps we create societal
ears that can hear and acknowledge the deep roots of intimate partner
abuse.

223

See Leigh Goodmark, Telling Stories, Saving Lives: The Battered Mothers’ Testimony
Project, Women’s Narratives, and Court Reform, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 709, 712 (2005). In this
article, Professor Goodmark examines the use of narrative in reform and discusses how
easily narrative can be discounted. Id. at 738–44. See generally Jane C. Murphy,
Lawyering for Social Change: The Power of the Narrative in Domestic Violence Law Reform, 21
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1243 (1993).

